时间：2020年11月28日8：00－12：00

腾讯会议：475878431

1.报告题目：Complete convergence for randomly weighted sums of random variables satisfying some moment inequalities

报告摘要：For random variables and random weights satisfying Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund and Rosenthal type moment inequalities, we establish complete convergence results for randomly weighted sumsof the random variables. Our results generalize those of Thanh et al. (2011), Han and Xiang (2016),Li et al. (2017), and Wang et al. (2018).

报告人：暨南大学  陈平炎

时间：11月28日 08:00-09:00

2.报告题目：Some convergence results for weighted sums of dependent random variables and applications

报告摘要：介绍几类相依结构随机序列的完全收敛性、完全矩收敛性等大样本统计理论研究的重要结果及其在多元线性回归模型、风险度量、更新计数过程中大样本统计理论的应用，通过设计算法，进行数值模拟，给出了具体分析结果，并进行比较。

报告人：安徽大学  王学军

时间：11月28日 09:00-10:00

3.报告题目：Number of edges in inhomogeneous random graphs

报告摘要：We study the number of edges in the inhomogeneous random graph when vertex weights have infinite mean and show that the number of edges is O(n log n). Central limit theorems for the number of edges are also established.

报告人：中国科学技术大学  胡治水

时间：11月28日 10:00-11:00

4.报告题目：Green supply chain contracts with eco-labels issued by the sales platform: profitability and environmental implications

报告摘要：Considering environmentally conscious consumers, a manufacturer, and a sales platform which provides eco-labels for qualified manufacturers, this paper develops a supply chain model to study how eco-labels affect green supply chain operations, from the profitability and environmental perspectives. The results show that the sales platform prefers the agency contract, but the manufacturer prefers the wholesale price contract. Considering the performance of the supply chain, the agency contract brings a higher profit while the wholesale price contract results in a bigger environmental improvement. An unexpected but interesting result is that when the agency contract is used and consumer green awareness increases, the sale price declines rather than increasing as it does under the wholesale price contract. This decline happens because the required marketing effort of the sales platform will be lower, which incentivises the platform to reduce the commission rate. Consequently, the manufacturer faces a lower commission rate and a higher margin when consumers display greater green awareness. Moreover, as the core and more powerful player of the supply chain, the sales platform can propose a platform-led revenue sharing contract to fully coordinate the supply chain, which improves the performance of the supply chain both in profitability and environmental perspectives.

报告人：中国科学技术大学  刘杰

时间：11月28日 11:00-12:00

邀请人：严继高